The political conditioning of subjective economic evaluations: the role of party discourse by Pardos-Prado, Sergi & Sagarzazu, Inaki
n 
 
 
 
Pardos-Prado, S., and Sagarzazu, I. (2014) The political conditioning of 
subjective economic evaluations: the role of party discourse. British Journal 
of Political Science . ISSN 0007-1234 
Copyright © 2014 Cambridge University Press 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format 
or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) 
 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/98264/ 
 
 
 
  Deposited on:  15 December 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
The Political Conditioning of Subjective1
Economic Evaluations: The Role of Party2
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Abstract
7
Classic and revisionist perspectives on economic voting have8
thoroughly analyzed the role of macro-economic indicators and9
individual partisanship as determinants of subjective evaluations of10
the national economy. Surprisingly, however, top-down perspectives11
analyzing the capacity of parties to cue and persuade voters about12
national economic conditions are absent in the debate. We use a novel13
dataset containing monthly economic salience in party parliamentary14
speeches, macro-economic indicators and individual survey data15
covering the four last electoral cycles in Spain (1996-2011). Our results16
show that the salience of economic issues in the challenger’s discourse17
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substantially increase negative evaluations of performance when this18
challenger is the owner of the economic issue. This type of party19
conditioning of public economic evaluations is independent from the20
state of the economy, and can affect citizens with different ideological21
orientations. By contrast, the persuasion capacity of incumbent parties22
is more constrained by the real economy.23
2
1 Introduction24
Punishing governments when the economy goes badly and rewarding them25
when the economy goes well is one of the pillars of democratic accountability.26
For decades, political scientists have thoroughly analyzed the validity and27
implications of this simple reward-punishment model applied to the economy28
1. The economic voting literature has grown upon the idea that changes29
to the real world economy affect citizens’ assessments of the economy’s30
performance, and that citizens’ economic evaluations influence their voting31
behavior 2. The existence of alternative determinants of subjective economic32
evaluations to explain the former causal nexus, however, has increasingly33
been a matter of debate. A new revisionist perspective argues that the34
classic reward-punishment model suffers from endogeneity biases, and that35
subjective perceptions of the national economy are partly a function of36
pre-existing party preferences 3.37
The determinants of the type of economic discourse in parties’38
communication strategies have recently received some attention 4. The39
difference in party economic positions 5 and the competence signal of the40
1for a review see M. S. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000, 2009)
2Tilley, Garry, and Bold (2008); M. Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Elias (2008); Fraile and
Lewis-Beck (2010)
3Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs (1997); Evans and Andersen (2006); Tilley and Hobolt
(2011); Evans and Pickup (2010); van der Eijk, Franklin, Demant, and van der Brug (2007);
Tilley et al. (2008)
4Vavreck (2009)
5Hellwig (2012)
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incumbent 6 have proved to be important conditioning factors strengthening41
the link between the economy and vote choice. However, the actual capacity42
of party discourse to actually persuade voters about economic performance43
is absent in this debate. This is surprising, since the capacity of parties44
in setting certain issues in the agenda and activating certain dimensions45
of conflict over others has proved to be remarkable in other sub-fields46
of political behavior 7. Previous research on the political conditioning of47
economic perceptions has normally considered individual-level factors like48
party identification or party choice. This literature follows the Michigan49
tradition of political research and considers partisanship as a “perceptual50
screen” influencing how voters reconcile information about policy outcomes51
with political choices 8. This conception of political conditioning, however,52
forgets the role of external sources of political cueing and therefore only53
accounts for individual-level mechanisms. Moreover, party identification is54
known to be a very stable individual trait, so it cannot be responsible for55
short-term changes in subjective economic evaluations.56
In this article we use a novel dataset of monthly party salience on economic57
issues obtained through content analyses of party questions in plenary58
debates in the Parliament. We have matched this dataset with objective59
macro-economic indicators and survey data on individual determinants of60
evaluations of the national economy, like ideological predispositions. Our61
6R. M. Duch and Stevenson (2008)
7Evans and Tilley (2011); C. J. Anderson and Just (in press)
8R. Duch and Stevenson (2010); Tilley and Hobolt (2011)
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analyses cover four electoral cycles in Spain (1996-2011).This time span62
and context is a conservative test for the effect of partisan sources of63
political conditioning of the economy, given the important variation in real64
macro-economic conditions from remarkably good to dramatically bad. This65
time span includes two electoral cycles when each of the two main Spanish66
parties (the conservative Partido Popular and the socialist Partido Socialista67
Obrero Espan˜ol) were in a single-party government. This context is thus68
ideal to test how (lagged) party discourse can matter, by observing the69
two main Spanish parties as incumbents and challengers, and across varying70
macro-economic conditions. The proportional and multiparty system in Spain71
makes it a comparable case across Western democracies. The strong pivotal72
role of the two main Spanish mainstream parties and their alternation in73
power, however, allow us to better identify the effect of a single party74
discourse when in government and in opposition.75
Our analyses show that party salience on the economy has a substantial76
effect in conditioning public economic perceptions. This is beyond the strong77
effect of objective macro-economic conditions, ideology and vote choice.78
However, party discourse needs two conditions to be effective. First, the79
party needs to be the issue owner and therefore hold a stronger reputation80
to deal with economic issues (which in this case is the right-of-center Partido81
Popular). Second, the party needs to be in opposition, since the effect of82
the incumbent’s discourse vanishes when controlling for the real economy.83
These findings have important implications for both classic and revisionist84
5
perspectives on the study of subjective economic perceptions. In line with85
classic perspectives, incumbent parties are very constrained by how the86
economy is really doing, and therefore their capacity to condition public87
opinion and pervert classical processes of accountability is very limited. In88
line with revisionist perspectives, however, the risk of political conditioning89
by parties with good economic reputation in opposition is remarkable.90
Moreover, this capacity to shape public opinion does not depend on how91
the economy is really doing, and does not only affect partisans or citizens92
with similar ideological views.93
2 Conditioning factors of Economic94
Perceptions95
Conventional wisdom in political science holds that the state of the economy96
affects electoral outcomes. One of the main traditions in the economic97
voting literature relies on aggregate data. Vote shares or approval ratings98
of the incumbent party over time are regressed on levels or changes of99
macro-economic conditions 9. Another tradition of research in the economic100
voting literature has dealt with survey data to demonstrate the association101
between economic performance and electoral outcomes at the individual102
level. The survey approach to economic voting has usually relied on the103
9van der Eijk et al. (2007)
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respondents’ views about the state of the economy 10.104
A considerable amount of research in the second tradition has suggested105
that sociotropic economic perceptions are associated with vote choices106
11. The magnitude and robustness of this association, however, is much107
higher in research using objective aggregate indicators 12. The effect of108
subjective evaluations of the economy on election results appears to largely109
depend on institutional factors 13, and on individual-level characteristics110
explaining how voters articulate their perceptions of the economy or attribute111
political responsibility 14. Thus, assessing sources of heterogeneity among112
individuals regarding the articulation of economic perceptions appears to be113
an important enterprise in this literature.114
The systematic analysis of the whole range of factors that connect objective115
macro-economic performance and individual subjective perceptions is still116
underdeveloped. In one of the scarce works directly tackling the individual117
heterogeneity of economic perceptions, 15 highlight four factors mediating the118
link between the objective and the subjective economy: (1) personal financial119
experience, (2) group self-interest, (3) political attitudes, and (4) information120
and media exposure,121
10van der Eijk et al. (2007); R. M. Duch and Stevenson (2008); Nadeau, Lewis-Beck,
and Be´langer (in press)
11R. M. Duch and Stevenson (2008); M. S. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007)
12M. S. Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000)
13Powell and Whitten (1993); Hellwig and Samuels (2008)
14C. Anderson (2007); M. S. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007); van der Brug, van der
Eijk, and Franklin (2007)
15R. M. Duch, Palmer, and Anderson (2000), 637-639
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Political attitudes as a source of heterogeneity in evaluations of the national122
economy is by far the most developed line of research, and has generated123
an intense debate about the degree of exogeneity of these evaluations 16.124
Political attitudes refer to the effect that ideology and partisanship have125
on economic evaluations. The main expectation is that individuals with126
strong attachments to the incumbent may perceive the national economy127
more positively. There is increasing evidence that party identification acts128
as a “perceptual screen” filtering facts from political reality 17. However, the129
effectiveness of this screen also depends on the clarity of responsibility as it130
regards the management of the economy 18131
The role of political factors like economic policy, political events and132
media coverage have been shown to condition levels of consumer confidence133
beyond the effect of the macro-economy 19. The literature assessing the134
mechanisms through which partisan cues can affect economic evaluations135
has not considered yet what parties say about the economy. The capacity136
of parties to politicize existing dimensions of political competition has137
proved to be crucial in other subfields of political behavior, like for example138
class cleavages 20 or support for the political system 21. This seems to be139
16Evans and Andersen (2006); M. Lewis-Beck et al. (2008); Evans and Pickup (2010);
Nadeau et al. (in press)
17Tilley and Hobolt (2011); Evans and Pickup (2010); van der Eijk et al. (2007); Tilley
et al. (2008); Parker-Stephen (2013b)
18Parker-Stephen (2013a)
19De Boef and Kellstedt (2004)
20Evans and Tilley (2011)
21C. J. Anderson and Just (in press)
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particularly relevant for the economic voting literature also, as focusing on140
a presumably stable trait such as party identification can give very little141
leverage to account for short-term changes in economic evaluations. The142
study of the possible political conditioning of economic evaluations should143
take into account voters’ partisanship, but also parties’ capacity to cue voters.144
This approach can be relevant for the controversy at stake. If top-down145
processes of political conditioning exist, a scenario of bad economic times and146
strong levels of partisanship for an incumbent party, for example, might not147
be enough to bias economic perceptions towards more positive evaluations.148
The direction and magnitude of the bias will depend on the capacity of149
the challenger to actually set economic issues into the public agenda, and150
persuade different kinds of voters across the ideological spectrum that the151
economy goes badly.152
2.1 Party discourse as a conditioning factor153
When including parties in economic voting studies, the main objects of study154
are three. First, the type of economic discourse and campaign that will155
most likely be followed by opposition and incumbent parties 22. Second,156
the conditioning role of party positions 23. And third party competence157
signals 24.These three have been found to be significant in activating the158
22Vavreck (2009)
23Hellwig (2012)
24R. M. Duch and Stevenson (2008)
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link between economic factors and the vote. The effect of party discourse159
on public economic perceptions, however, is still a prominent gap in the160
literature.161
Figure 1 shows what would be a traditional expectation of political162
conditioning of the economy. On the X-axis is the “Real Economy” and163
on the Y-axis the “Perceived Economy”. In a perfect setting we would164
expect citizens perceptions to match the the cues given by the real economy;165
however, we know that this is not to be the case. As Parker-Stephen25 has166
found, for instance, partisan attachments alter this linear relationship and167
make government partisans more optimistic, and opponents more pessimistic.168
However, this partisan effect only exists in a middle ranged zone since at too169
good or too bad economic climates citizens converge in their perceptions170
26.171
Figure 1: Political Conditioning of the Economy
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25Parker-Stephen (2013b)
26Parker-Stephen (2013b)
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Following this line of argument we argue that it is in this middle zone172
where party discourse can effectively condition economic perceptions of173
citizens. However, instead of discourse having the capability of affecting these174
perceptions in a positive and/or negative way (as depicted in figure 2a) we175
argue that it can only affect them negatively (as figure 2b shows). Specifically,176
we reach this argument by merging the theory of issue ownership 27 with that177
of negativity bias 28.178
Figure 2: Political Conditioning by Party Discourse
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Issue ownership theory is an influential framework in economic voting studies,179
and it allows us to derive observable implications regarding the effect of party180
discourse. Issue ownership theory predicts that voters will evaluate parties or181
candidates on important issues, and that some issues will naturally advantage182
27Petrocik (1996)
28Vonk (1996); Singh and Teoh (2000); Soroka (2006); Soroka and McAdams (in press)
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or disadvantage one party over the others 29. In issue ownership terms, the183
party should prime an issue that it owns. The theoretical presumption is184
that when a party owns an issue it is perceived by the electorate as being185
better and more credible at handling problems in that issue area 30. For186
instance, in the United States, Democrats are considered to own the issue187
of health care, and Republicans are believed to own the issue of national188
security 31. Similarly, in Western European countries, socialist parties are189
perceived to own welfare politics, while right-wing parties are believed to190
own the issue of immigration and economic growth, and green parties are191
believed to own environmental issues 32. When a party owns an issue, and192
public opinion considers that issue as important, the theory predicts that the193
party’s candidates should benefit electorally. A more refined interpretation of194
issue ownership has led researchers to consider some specific economic topics195
as likely to benefit the electoral prospects of certain types of parties. From196
this perspective, inflation is likely to benefit center-right parties, whereas197
unemployment is likely to connect with the issue priorities and competence198
reputation of center-left parties 33. Recent comparative economic voting199
studies, however, have found mixed evidence for this refined version of issue200
ownership applied to the study of the economy and the vote 34.201
29Petrocik (1996)
30Budge and Farlie (1983); Riker (1986); Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen (2003)
31Petrocik (1996)
32Budge, Robertson, and Hearl (1987)
33Hibbs and Vasilatos (1982); C. J. Anderson (1995)
34Hellwig (2012)
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The ownership of the economy or a high political reputation to deal with202
it becomes crucial according to this theoretical framework. The issue owner203
is thus expected to have more economic credibility and therefore to be able204
to condition public opinion more clearly. This expectation implies a direct205
effect of the issue owner’s discourse beyond and independently from the real206
economy. The idea that parties’ economic discourse is a sole function of the207
macro-economy would imply that the former is in some sense a mirror image208
of the latter. If incumbents are to influence public opinion when the economy209
goes well, and if challengers have to do so when the economy goes badly, the210
true driver of the effect is the macro-economy and thus party discourse has211
very little leverage to shape public perceptions. If party discourse has any212
substantive relevance in the process of political conditioning of economic213
perceptions, this means that those parties holding a better reputation of214
handling economic issues should be able to persuade voters beyond how215
things are really going.216
There are reasons, however, to suspect that the credibility of the issue owner’217
messages will differ depending on whether it is in or out of power. In her218
study about how voters evaluate economic competence in Britain, Butt35219
shows that retrospective evaluations of economic performance influence220
evaluations of the incumbent, but that this is not so regarding the challenger.221
While citizens can rely on an up-to-date performance record to judge the222
incumbent (through the real macro-economy, for example), the judgement223
35Butt (2006)
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about the discourse and hypothetical performance of the challenger can be224
more responsive to ideological predispositions and partisan cues 36. The225
actual experience of living under the current government is certain and226
readily available, and therefore the discourse of the incumbent should have227
a much more limited power to persuade voters. By contrast, the evaluation228
of the prospective performance and current discourse of the challenger can229
be more subject to partisan sources of information and persuasion. While230
the incumbent has to deal with “real events”, the challenger can be judged231
“only by talk” 37. This is consistent with De Boef and Kellsted’s findings that232
presidents in the US cannot always use the power of the press to maintain233
high approval ratings, and that presidents in power “cannot use rhetoric to234
consistently dupe the public” 38.235
The stronger potential for opposition parties in setting economic issues in the236
agenda and conditioning public perceptions beyond the real macroeconomic237
facts is also supported by research in political psychology documenting238
negativity bias in information reception. Negative information has a239
significantly larger effect in impression formation 39. From a political240
behaviour perspective, Claggett40 showed that the relationship between241
macroeconomic conditions and the response of the congressional electorate is242
asymmetric. Contractions reduce the vote share of the incumbent party but243
36Butt (2006)
37Popkin (1995), p. 29
38De Boef and Kellstedt (2004)
39Vonk (1996); Singh and Teoh (2000)
40Claggett (1986)
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the incumbent party is not rewarded for economic expansions 41. Lau also244
found evidence that negative information is more influential than positive245
information in affecting evaluations of presidential candidates 42. More246
recently, media studies have provided evidence that negative views are more247
likely to attract media’s attention and to be set in the public agenda 43.248
Based on these predictions, and if party discourse is able to shape public249
evaluations of economic performance, one can expect that the owner of250
the economy will be more successful than the party not owning it in251
shaping public perceptions. Moreover, both the constraints of real facts for252
incumbent parties and the negativity bias framework expect the discourse253
of the challenger to be more likely to set economic issues in the agenda and254
to condition public opinion. Table 1 summarizes these predictions.255
256
Table 1: Theoretical expectations
Non Issue Owner Issue Owner
Incumbent No effect No effect
Opposition No effect Effect
Our reasoning implies that important partisan sources of political257
conditioning of economic evaluations may be at play, and that this should258
be to a large extent independent from the real economy and individual259
ideological predispositions. However, our expectations acknowledge the role260
41Claggett (1986)
42Lau (1985)
43Soroka (2006); Soroka and McAdams (in press)
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of the real economy and classic accountability, in the sense that incumbent261
parties’ real performance should be more important than their discourse.262
Moreover, we only expect party effects among economically credible parties.263
It is important to stress that our theory does not intend to resolve the264
controversy between classic and revisionist perspectives. Our attempt is265
rather to include a substantively important factor that has been overlooked266
in the literature, and to deepen our understanding of when and why external267
partisan cues should shape public opinion.268
3 Research Design269
In this section we describe the data collected for the purposes of testing270
the expectations laid out before. Three elements are critical in this task: 1)271
choosing the country to analyze, 2) obtaining a measure of party salience,272
and 3) assessing voters’ economic evaluations. Each of these three elements273
is explained below.274
3.1 Spain: from bounty to crisis275
The expectations of different economic voting models have been largely276
tested in Anglo-American democracies. The reward-punishment logic is a277
very intuitive model to apply in two-party majoritarian democracies, where278
there are usually single-party governments and one clear challenger. We279
16
believe that extending the test to a multi-party proportional system like280
Spain, which is a less studied context in the economic voting literature, can281
increase the comparative power of the propositions sketched out above. Spain282
is also a relevant context to test our theoretical propositions, since it went283
from relatively good macro-economic conditions to be one of the Western284
democracies more punished by the global economic meltdown. This is thus a285
conservative test for party discourse, given the presumably important effects286
of macro-economic conditions 44.287
The time span analyzed covers four electoral cycles. The two first cycles288
(March 1996-March 2000, and April 2000-March 2004) had a right-wing single289
party government, and the two last cycles (April 2004-March 2008, and April290
2008-November 2011) had a left-wing single party government. This allows291
us to vary the ideological orientation of incumbent parties. We focus on292
the two main parties competing in general elections in Spain, namely the293
left-wing socialist incumbent Partido Socialista Obrero Espan˜ol (PSOE) and294
the right-wing conservative Partido Popular (PP) in the opposition. In spite295
of the presence of many other parties in the Spanish political spectrum, the296
PP and PSOE could govern over two electoral cycles respectively without the297
need of any coalition partner. In spite of acknowledging the role that other298
parties exert in the Spanish national Parliament, we keep the distinction299
between one main incumbent and one main challenging party which is300
inherent in the theory sketched out above.301
44Fraile and Lewis-Beck (2010)
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The party with a stronger reputation of dealing with economic issues302
is the PP. Apart from an intuitive link between economic priorities303
and economic issues in Western Europe 45, the link between economic304
competence and right-wing parties is particularly likely in Spain given305
the bad macro-economic performance of the country during its democratic306
stabilisation (during the 80’s and early 90’s) under socialist rule.307
Furthermore, the PP is -according to survey data such as the European308
Election Studies- the party most able to handle the issue of the Economy309
over the time span analyzed.46 Previous research on economic voting in the310
Spanish context shows that the link between macroeconomic conditions and311
the PSOE’s electoral results is non-existent. This finding confirms the lack312
of connection between economic priorities, economic competence reputation313
and the PSOE’s electoral prospects. Rather than economic considerations, an314
electoral coalition of primarily blue-collar workers, rural voters, and voters315
dependent on state-subsidized income explain the historical disconnection316
between PSOE’s electoral victories and economic fluctuations 47.317
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the Unemployment Rate(solid line) and of318
45Budge and Farlie (1983); Van der Brug (2004)
46While the results for 2004 overall show a majority preference for the PSOE it is
important to highlight that the EES2004 survey was carried after an exceptional election
conditioned by the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, and during the honeymoon
stage of the new socialist government. Upon closer inspection those in the middle of the
ideological spectrum consider the PP as most able by a 64%-34% margin. This is further
corroborated with the EES1999 and EES2009 studies, where a majority (>50%) prefer
the PP in handling the economy.
47Hamann (2000)
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the rate of change of the Consumer Price Index (dashed line) 48, which319
are the indicators available at the monthly level and used in the analyses320
below. These were obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica49321
datasets. Unfortunately, data on GDP is only collected every three months,322
thus decreasing considerably the number of time points available in the323
analysis. This is why we only report the results concerning unemployment324
and inflation, for which we have available monthly data.50 The graph shows325
three vertical lines dividing each of the four governments in our study. As it326
can be appreciated, during the time when the right-wing PP was in power327
(1996-2004) there is a clear improvement of unemployment rates, but there328
is a gradual and steady increase of inflation which can be seen in the mostly329
positive change over time. In spite of the general feeling of good economic330
competence on the PP’s side reflected by the famous slogan “Espan˜a va bien”331
(“Spain is going well”), the increase of prices exacerbated by the introduction332
of the Euro in Spain (around the middle of the 1996-2004 period) and the333
maximal inflation rate value observed along the whole time span analyzed334
could have been used by the PSOE as a shadow over the macro-economic335
reality during the PP’s incumbency. Even if, on average, the PSOE’s336
incumbency clearly had a worse macro-economic performance (especially due337
to the global economic meltdown in the 2008-2011 period), there was still338
48For graphical purposes we are using a six month moving average.
49www.ine.es (14/01/2013)
50Our main findings for the 2004-2011 period remain unchanged when replicating our
models with GDP, and party discourse effects appear stronger for the 1996-2004 period.
Results available in table A.2 in the online appendix.
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some macro-economic variation that the challenger’s discourse could have339
used in its benefit between 1996 and 2004. Similarly, not everything was340
dramatically good or bad during the years when PSOE was in office. Even341
if both unemployment and inflation rates increased to maximal levels at342
the end of the time span analyzed, unemployment rates went actually down343
during the first PSOE’s legislature (2004-2008). Briefly, the macro-economic344
variation seems to be sufficient within each incumbency period as to test the345
effect of party discourse not as a mirror image of macro-economic variation,346
but as an independent effect beyond economic reality.347
Figure 3: Evolution of Macroeconomic indicators over time
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3.2 Party Questioning of Government348
In order to measure issue attention of the two major Spanish parties, we349
rely on the questions made by party members in the plenary sessions of the350
Spanish parliament. In most ‘plenos’ there is a section where the different351
members of parliament can question the representatives of the government352
present.353
Attention to issues by political parties has received increasing attention in354
the literature. Most studies have focused on the salience of issues to political355
parties ahead of elections, by using party manifestos or expert surveys 51.356
While these studies have advanced our knowledge of parties on strategic357
actors in the issue domain they have shed little light into the actual electoral358
dynamics and how they affect issue politics and vice-versa. That is, the degree359
to which parties highlight more or less different issues through short spans360
of time. As such plenary questions constitute an ideal source for measuring361
attention during the electoral cycle.362
Party debates in Congress represent a unique source of data that has proved363
to be useful for many analysis of legislative behavior. The assumption is364
that parties’ attention to different issues in Parliament is a good proxy to365
measure the issue hierarchy in the parties’ general communication strategy.366
In the same way that manifestos are a source of data to measure issue367
51see for instance Budge and Bara (2001); Benoit and Laver (2006); Klingemann,
Volkens, Bara, Budge, and McDonald (2006); Steenbergen and Marks (2007); Hooghe
et al. (2010)
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emphasis even if most citizens do not actually read manifestos, research using368
parliamentary questions and speeches assumes that parties communication369
strategies will reach public opinion through the media and the public debate.370
Exchanges between legislators in plenary sessions have been used to obtain371
the ideological positioning of these legislators 52; or to understand the372
dynamics of who speaks and who doesn’t 53. In the Danish and Belgian373
cases debates in the floor of the parliament have allowed for the study of374
who sets the agenda 54. These two studies, for instance, find that MP’s focus375
mostly on their owned issues and on the issues raised by the media. As can376
be seen from this short sample speeches from the parliamentary floor are a377
relevant source of dynamics of parliament but also -and more relevant to this378
study- of the issue priorities of MP’s and their parties.379
Table 2 shows some of these interactions in the Spanish Parliament.380
Specifically it shows a question by a member of the governing PP party and381
of the opposition PSOE in a pleno carried out in November 2003. Similarly382
it shows a question by the governing PSOE and the opposition PP made383
in December 2004. All the four questions refer to the issue of the economy,384
however, the tone with which these questions are asked makes evident who is385
the party in opposition. The harsher, more negative, questions -or framing-386
always comes from the opposing party, while the subtle -more nuanced-387
52Slapin and Proksch (2008); Proksch and Slapin (2010); Falco´-Gimeno and Vallbe´
(2013)
53Proksch and Slapin (2011, 2012); Ba¨ck and Debus (2013)
54Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010); Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011)
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question comes from the government side. The tone of these questions, which388
comes as no surprise, supports the underlying theme of this study. Because389
the opposing party will always be negative regarding the economy -as it has390
no advantage to do otherwise- when it raises the attention over this issue it391
should affect citizens view of the topic.392
Table 2: Examples of questions to the government
VIIth Legislature. November 26th, 2003
MP Salvador Sanz Palacio (PP) Can the first Vice-President of the
Government explain about the evolution
of prices in the month of October? 55
MP Jesus Cuadrado Bausela (PSOE) What type of economic measures does the
government plan to adopt in light of the
distortions in the food market that are
causing so many problems to farmers and
consumers?56
VIIIth Legislature. December 15th, 2004
MP Angel Pintado Barbano (PP) Is the government thinking of taking any
measures to palliate the grave situation
of wine’s commercialization? 57
MP Alejandro Alonso Nunez (PSOE) What is the strategy that the Government
is going to develop given the current
situation of the wine-making industry? 58
We obtained the plenary debates from the publicly available data of the393
Spanish Parliament. From these we selected all the plenary sessions where394
there was a specific moment for Questions to the Government. Table 3 shows395
the total number of plenary sessions where questions where being asked.396
It also shows the number of questions asked on average in each session by397
each of the two main parties. And the total number of questions asked per398
23
legislature, by party.399
Table 3: Average number of questions asked in plenos and total per legislature
Legislatura # Plenos PP PSOE Others
VI (1996-2000) 72 9 (612 ) 9 (638 ) 4 (277 )
VII (2000-2004) 66 10 (800 ) 8 (660 ) 4 (342 )
VIII (2004-2008) 56 8 (683 ) 8 (680 ) 6 (437 )
IX (2008-2011) 9 9 (260 ) 4 (112 ) 4 (108 )
It becomes clear that the Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista400
dominate the debates in the plenary sessions. It is interesting to note that401
regardless of their role, as government or opposition parties, they behave402
quite similarly. On average, both the PP and the PSOE have a similar number403
of interactions per plenary which is almost four times what the rest of the404
parties combined get. It is interesting to notice that in the last legislature405
(2008-2011) there is a big drop in the number of sessions with questions and406
of questions (specially by the PSOE). However, we see no concern in this. We407
acknowledge that as the crisis worsened the PSOE implemented its agenda408
control mechanisms to minimize its exposure, it diminished the number of409
sessions with questioning and it limited interventions of its own members.410
Party questions in Parliament therefore provide a detailed account of the411
issue priorities of political parties.412
To analyze the questions and obtain issue attention measures, we use a similar413
quantitative text analysis approach to that of Sagarzazu59 which applies414
59Sagarzazu (2011)
24
cluster analysis to textual data. This approach is of the “Bag of Words”415
family of text analysis mechanisms that considers words as independent416
observations 60. The underlying assumption behind using clustering analysis417
for obtaining issue measures is that words that belong to the same issue have418
similar patterns of behavior, as opposed to words that belong to different419
issue areas, which can be identified via clustering techniques 61. Specifically,420
we estimate the distances of the correlations between the different words and421
cluster the words based on these distances.422
In order to be able to apply quantitative text analysis techniques to a raw text423
corpus, a series of preparatory steps are required. First, all questions need to424
be converted into plain text files, all HTML code tags need to be removed, and425
all words need to be changed to lowercase. Second, stop words, punctuations,426
numbers, currencies and party labels from the documents are eliminated.427
Third, a stemmer was used to convert words to their stemmed root.62 Fourth,428
with the dataset reduced to stem counts we computed matrices that indicate429
how many times each stem occurs in each press release. Finally, following430
common practice in the literature, we removed very frequent words occurring431
in more than 95% of the questions and very rare words occurring in less than432
5% of the texts 63.433
60e.g. Slapin and Proksch (2008); Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003); Grimmer (2010);
Quinn, Monroe, Colaresi, Crespin, and Radev (2010)
61Sagarzazu (2011)
62From this point forward we will refer to words and stems interchangeably.
63see Klu¨ver (2009); Proksch and Slapin (2008)
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Having generated the initial word count matrix we begin an iterative process434
in which we cluster words based on the distances between them. In each435
step we multiply the word matrix by its transposed matrix to retain a436
word-to-word matrix where each cell indicates the number of times that437
two words are mentioned together. In order to correct for overdispersion438
-caused by too frequent and too infrequent joint mentions- we normalized439
this matrix by means of the squared root of each cell. We then estimate440
the distances between the word correlations and use this as the measure of441
closeness between different words needed for the clustering analysis 64. This442
measure allows the clustering algorithm to establish the groups based on the443
proximity of the elements 65. The final stage of the process involves estimating444
the different word clusters. Specifically we use a hierarchical clustering445
algorithm66 which infers relationships from the data itself 67. Clustering446
techniques are mathematical tools that allow the classification of data447
according to latent characteristics 68. The result of applying the clustering448
algorithm to the distances between the words is a tree-like structure where449
words are organized by how close or distant they are between them 69. In450
each iteration the tree was automatically divided into clusters, we tried with451
varying sizes from 5 to 20 clusters. Based on this division we assessed the452
64Jain, Murty, and Flynn (1999)
65Jain et al. (1999)
66We used the R function hclust from the package cluster for the hierarchical
clustering.
67Kaufman and Rousseeuw (1990)
68Everitt (1980); Gordon (1981)
69Everitt (1980); Gordon (1981)
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organization of the words and the clusters, and in each iteration we removed453
non-political words that were not members of any particular cluster but454
that instead because they are mentioned in different issues irrespectively455
are close to words from many clusters and as such tend to remain high in456
the tree structure -and alone-. 70 By doing this analysis we were able to457
obtain a clear structure of words and clusters based on the co-occurrence458
of words. This structure was remarkably consistent throughout the different459
iterations. After four iterations we were able to identify seven politically460
relevant clusters.71 These are: Economy, Education, Health, Infrastructure,461
International Relations, Gender, and State matters. The main words that462
clustered under each cluster are shown in table 4.463
70In the different iterations we removed verb stems or pronouns with little to non
political meaning. Examples include: dear, form, stopping, and use.
71A fifth iteration as attempted however it made the clusters too fine grained to the
point were some of their meaning was lost.
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Besides checking for the face validity of the words and the clusters we looked464
for external validity. Given that we are looking at speeches in the floor of465
parliament it can be assumed that the questions will resemble the structure466
of the parliamentary committees (which is similar to the structure of cabinet467
portfolios). As such we checked the seven issue areas with the 17 permanent468
legislative commissions. Given that we have less issues than committees we469
will expect to have several committees grouped into one of our issue areas.470
Table 5 shows this comparison. As it can be seen the resemblance of the471
committee structure and the issues identified is quite similar. Most of the472
committees can be identified by only one issue area, with the only exception473
of the Taxes and Public Administrations committee which deals both with474
economic aspects but also with state matters. The only committee we could475
not match to a single issue area was the Budget/Appropriations committee,476
given that budget discussions tend to be involved in every policy area 72.477
As it can be seen both from an internal stand-point (face validity) and an478
external validity check, our issue clusters provide a reasonable classification479
of parliamentary questions into relevant policy issues.480
As we are particularly interested in the attention parties give to the economy481
we will focus solely on this issue. In order to illustrate how issue attention482
varies over the course of the four legislative terms, figure 4 plots the attention483
that the PSOE and the PP payed to the economy as a proportion of the total484
time the party spoke. This figure shows two interesting dynamics that occur485
72Calvo and Sagarzazu (2011)
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Table 5: Key terms in Economic area
Committee Issue Area
Agriculture, Food, and Environment Economy
Economy and Competitiveness Economy
Taxes and Public Administrations Economy / State Matters
Constitutional State Matters
Interior State Matters
Justice State Matters
Culture Education/Research/Sports/Culture
Education and Sports Education/Research/Sports/Culture
Industry, Energy and Tourism Education/Research/Sports/Culture
Equality Gender
Infrastructure Infrastructure
Foreign Affairs International Affairs
International Cooperation for Development International Affairs
Defense International Affairs
Employment and Social Security Health
Health and Social Services Health
Budget -
in the four legislatures. First, a similar attention dynamic that can be found486
in the VIth and VIIIth legislatures, in these two sections (the first and third)487
we can see no major differences between both parties. These legislatures488
are similar not only in the attention to the economy by the parties but489
in the fact that they were the result of a change in control of parliament490
and end in a re-election of the governing party. The second dynamic can491
be seen on the other two sections. In these (the second and fourth) we see492
more attention to the economy by the party in the opposition (PSOE in493
the second section - VIIth legislature-, PP in the last - IXth legislature).494
While the dominance of the PSOE is more clear in the VIIth legislature than495
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Figure 4: Issue attention over time
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the PP’s dominance in the IXth legislature the overall pattern is still there496
throughout. Coincidentally, the issue attention of each party overrides that497
of the rival party when both PP and PSOE are in opposition, and in the498
period prior to their access to power. This descriptive evidence is consistent499
with our intuition that parties’ have more incentives to stress economic issues500
and to have more potential persuasion power when in opposition, and not501
when there is a macro-economic reality that speaks for their performance as502
incumbents.503
3.3 Spanish monthly survey504
For each month or time point with available party discourse data, we have505
matched monthly survey data conducted by the Centro de Investigaciones506
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Sociologicas (CIS) in Spain.73 The CIS conducts monthly barometers together507
with many other types of surveys in Spain.74 Each of the monthly barometers508
contains a random sample of the Spanish population with valid answers to our509
dependent variable between 2,376 and 4,874 individuals. The pooled dataset510
that we obtain after matching all the monthly surveys for which we have data511
on party discourse contains 320,793 individuals across 127 time points.512
The dependent variable that is available in each of the surveys used in the513
models below is the assessment of the current national state of the economy.514
The wording of the question is: “As regards the general economic situation515
in Spain, how would you assess it?”. The possible answers are “very good”,516
“good”, “neither good nor bad”, “bad” and “very bad”. The economic voting517
literature tends to rely on retrospective evaluations of the economy, which are518
unfortunately just available in 58 surveys during the time span analyzed. The519
wording of the item is: “do you think that the current economic situation is520
better, the same, or worse than a year ago?”. Since we have more time points521
available for the item capturing current national conditions, this is the one522
that we use in the models reported below. In any case, the correlation between523
both items is moderately high (r=0.42, p=0.000). When running a factor524
and a principal components analysis, both items clearly load on the same525
dimension with factor loadings of 0.54 and 0.71 respectively. When replicating526
the fully specified models shown below with retrospective evaluations as the527
73See technical documentation and sampling procedures of each survey in www.cis.es
(15/01/13)
74Except for August of each year, when the CIS does not conduct any survey.
32
dependent variable, our substantive results remain unchanged. 75. Figure 5528
plots the aggregate responses to the Subjective National economy question.529
The solid line represents the percentage of respondents who answer that the530
economy is Good or Very Good. In dashed line are those who answered that531
it was neither good nor bad. And in a dotted line are those who answered it532
was Bad or Very Bad.533
Figure 5: Evolution of Subjective economic evaluations over time
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We use two indicators to control for ideological predispositions. First, we534
use the standard left-right scale from 1 to 10, which is well-known for535
summarizing a number of ideological predispositions and for being a good536
vote choice predictor in Western Europe. The wording of the item is: “When537
talking about politics, people normally use the expressions ‘left’ and ‘right’.538
In this card there is a set of boxes going from left to right. Where would you539
75Results available in Table A.3 of the online appendix.
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place yourself?”. Unfortunately, there is no indicator available for the whole540
time span that we are analyzing on party identification, in the way that this541
item is asked and used in American politics, for instance. Alternatively, we542
use vote recall in the last national election. Vote choice has been used in543
previous research as a proxy for partisan orientation in the economic voting544
literature 76. Finally, we also include a set of control variables available in545
the CIS surveys like age, gender, educational level, and professional status546
(being unemployed).77547
Our modelling strategy conceptualizes our dataset as a two-level structure548
where different individuals (level 1) are nested in different months or time549
points (level 2). In order to obtain accurate standard errors and non-inflated550
levels of significance for our time-level variables (namely party discourse551
and macro-economic indicators), we predict individual economic assessments552
using hierarchical ordinal logit models78 79. We choose this modelling strategy553
because our outcome and some of the important determinants of economic554
perceptions identified in the literature (like partisan predispositions and555
all our control variables) are measured at the individual level, while our556
hypothesized party effects and the macro-economy are time-level indicators.557
This also allows us to use the full statistical power of our dataset. Our time or558
level-2 equation, however, has a time series structure, since monthly averages559
76van der Eijk et al. (2007); Tilley et al. (2008)
77Summary statistics of our variables can be found in Table A.1 of the online appendix.
78Using Stata 12’s GLLAMM package.
79Hox (2010)
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are regressed over time. To make sure that our main results are not biased by560
temporal autocorrelation, we conducted several tests, and included the lagged561
monthly average of our dependent variable as a predictor. Our substantive562
results remained unchanged (see robustness checks and Appendix). All the563
variables in our models have been centered around their mean, in order564
to obtain meaningful intercept variances. It is important to note that the565
validity of our strategy relies on the assumption that our time random effects566
are not correlated with any of the covariates included in the model. Our567
statistical model can be formalized as follows:568
Logit(Yit) = α + β1Xit + β2Zt−1 + β3Et−1 + ΘVi + ut + it (1)
Where,569
Yit is the level of economic evaluation for a given individual i at time t570
α is the cut-off point of economic evaluations when all other covariates are 0571
Xit is individual-level ideological predispositions (left-right and vote choice572
at time t)573
Zt−1 is lagged party discourse574
Et−1 is lagged macro-economic indicators (unemployment and inflation)575
βk are the fixed parameters for party discourse, macro-economic condition576
and ideological predispositions577
ut is the random intercept at the time-level578
it is the prediction error of each observation579
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Θ is the vector of fixed parameters for the individual level control variables580
(Vi)581
582
4 Results583
Table 6 reports a set of nested hierarchical ordinal logit models predicting584
economic evaluations (coded from positive to negative) corresponding to the585
period when the conservative PP was in power (March 1996-March 2004).586
The first model shows the direct effect of party discourse with no controls.587
The second model controls for macro-economic variables, the third controls588
for ideological predispositions, and the fourth reports a fully specified model589
with the whole set of controls. The fourth model shows the most satisfactory590
level of fit to the data, given a substantial and significant reduction in the591
AIC and BIC indexes. As explained above, the bad economic performance of592
Spain under socialist governments before 1996, the good economic reputation593
ratings of PP in this period, and most importantly the perceptions of citizens594
as to which party is most able to handle the economy allow us to consider595
the PP as having an advantage in terms of economic issue ownership.596
Even if party discourse appears as significant in the first and third models,597
its statistical significance vanishes when (and only when) controlling for598
unemployment and inflation in the second and fourth models. Consistently599
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with our expectations, despite the PP’s reputational advantage and the600
increasing improvement of the economy over the 1996-2004 period, the601
effect of the objective economy outperforms the persuasion capacity of the602
issue owner as an incumbent. It is important to stress that the significance603
of the effect of party discourse resists the inclusion of attitudinal and604
socio-demographic variables, and only disappears when controlling for the605
objective economy. The persuasion capacity of both an incumbent party with606
a significant economic reputation (but constrained by the objective facts)607
and an opposition party with a weaker economic credibility was very limited608
between 1996 and 200480.609
Table 7 replicated the same analyses for the 2004-2011 period, when the610
PSOE was in government and the PP in opposition. Consistently with611
our expectations, the discourse of the party in power becomes insignificant612
when (and only when) controlling for the real macro-economy in models613
2 and 4. When specified without controls or together with ideological614
heuristics in models 1 and 3, the effect of PSOE’s insistence on the economy615
seems to decrease negative economic evaluations, as it would correspond to616
an incumbent party. Despite having an important advantage in economic617
reputation at the start of the period, the persuasion effect of the PSOE’s618
80The signs of party discourse for the 1996-2004 period may seem counter-intuitive. The
positive sign of PP discourse is mainly driven by non-PP voters, who reacted negatively
to PP’s discourse. This effect, however, is small (below 5 per cent probability change)
and barely significant. This is consistent with the negativity framework used above. The
governing party’s discourse is only able to slightly increase negative perceptions among
non-supporters, even if this effect is non-significant. See Table A.9 and Figure A.1 in the
online Appendix.
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discourse is again tied to the real facts and overshadowed by the effect of619
unemployment and inflation. By contrast, the effect of the PP’s discourse620
is positive and significant across all model specifications, meaning that it621
worsened public economic evaluations in a consistent manner. As expected,622
this effect takes place when the conservatives were in opposition.623
As noted above, our theoretical framework assumes a more prominent role624
and capacity of opposition parties to set economic issues in the agenda.625
In order to find evidence for this assumption, we constructed a measure626
capturing the total amount of attention to economic issues by the parties with627
representation in the Spanish Parliament over the time span analysed (PP,628
PSOE, Izquierda Unida, Grupo Mixto and Catalan and Basque nationalists).629
We interpret this measure as a proxy for general economic saliency in the630
Parliament. When regressing this measure on lagged economic attention of631
the two main parties and a time trend, only the party in opposition has a632
positive and significant effect on general economic saliency (PSOE in the633
1996-2004 period, and PP in the 2004-2011 period). By contrast, the effect634
of the incumbent party discourse is non-significant in the 1996-2004 period,635
and negative in the 2004-2011 period. This confirms the higher constraints636
of governing parties in setting economic issues in the agenda beyond what637
the real macro-economy says.81638
81The results in Tables 6 and 7 hold also when controlling for this total amount of
attention to economic issues index. Results available in Table A.4 of the online appendix.
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Table 6: Direct effects of party discourse during PP incumbency (1996-2004)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PSOE discourset−1
-1.852*** -0.473 -1.831*** -0.605
(0.473) (0.439) (0.453) (0.571)
PP discourset−1
4.085*** 1.281 3.985*** 0.924
(0.708) (0.747) (0.780) (1.005)
Unemploymentt−1 -
0.188***
-
0.182***
(0.025) (0.029)
Inflationt−1 -
0.077***
-
0.078***
(0.016) (0.018)
Left-right ideology - -
-0.196*** -0.213***
(0.004) (0.004)
Vote PSOE - -
0.150*** 0.123***
(0.017) (0.017)
Vote PP - -
-0.666*** -0.652***
(0.016) (0.016)
Gender - - -
0.448***
(0.012)
Age - - -
-0.001***
(0.000)
Education - - -
-0.258***
(0.007)
Unemployed - - -
0.353***
(0.021)
Cut 1
-4.352*** -4.927*** -4.696*** -5.408***
(0.039) (0.155) (0.040) (0.176)
Cut 2
-0.948*** -1.523*** -1.149*** -1.804***
(0.031) (0.154) (0.032) (0.174)
Cut 3
1.434*** 0.859*** 1.403*** 0.809***
(0.031) (0.153) (0.032) (0.174)
Cut 4
3.264*** 2.689*** 3.277*** 2.704***
(0.034) (0.154) (0.035) (0.174)
Time intercept variance
0.481*** 0.319*** 0.488*** 0.301***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.028)
N individuals 106666 106666 106666 106666
N time 63 63 63 63
Log likelihood -122275 -122254 -117248 -115464
AIC 244564 244526 234516 230959
BIC 244631 244613 234611 23111339
Table 7: Direct effects of party discourse during PSOE incumbency
(2004-2011)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
PSOE discourset−1
-5.471** -0.021 -5.553*** -0.493
(1.806) (0.498) (1.620) (0.344)
PP discourset−1
6.644*** 1.568** 6.916*** 1.860***
(1.077) (0.509) (1.020) (0.528)
Unemploymentt−1 -
0.124***
-
0.127***
(0.008) (0.008)
Inflationt−1 -
0.119***
-
0.108***
(0.006) (0.008)
Left-right ideology - -
0.080*** 0.065***
(0.004) (0.004)
Vote PSOE - -
-0.283*** -0.336***
(0.013) (0.013)
Vote PP - -
0.209*** 0.241***
(0.017) (0.017)
Gender - - -
0.289***
(0.011)
Age - - -
-0.002***
(0.000)
Education - - -
-0.225***
(0.006)
Unemployed - - -
0.437***
(0.017)
Cut 1
-5.540*** -4.654*** -5.641*** -4.984***
(0.141) (0.076) (0.135) (0.089)
Cut 2
-1.804*** -0.919*** -1.892*** -1.204***
(0.135) (0.065) (0.129) (0.079)
Cut 3
0.479*** 1.364*** 0.424** 1.155***
(0.135) (0.065) (0.129) (0.080)
Cut 4
2.252*** 3.137*** 2.234*** 2.996***
(0.135) (0.066) (0.129) (0.080)
Time intercept variance
1.075*** 0.263*** 1.100*** 0.352***
(0.088) (0.018) (0.081) (0.016)
N individuals 115978 115978 115978 115978
N time 63 63 63 63
Log Likelihood -137091 -136996 -135665 -133995
AIC 274196 274009 271349 268023
BIC 274264 274096 271446 268177
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As expected by the classical punishment-reward model of economic voting,639
worsening macro-economic conditions in terms of unemployment and640
inflation are strongly and significantly associated with worsening economic641
evaluations. Classical refined issue ownership theories expecting inflation and642
unemployment to benefit center-right and center-left parties respectively,643
however, are not validated in our data 82. This is consistent with recent644
comparative economic studies, where the heterogeneity across inflation645
and unemployment effects across ideological incumbent orientation is not646
validated 83. The revisionist model is also validated with our data, since647
left-right ideology an vote choice are also consistently associated with648
economic perceptions. Right-wing and PP voters had more favorable views649
when PP was in power, and left-wing and PSOE voters had more favorable650
views when PSOE was in power.651
Figure 6 reports the results of a probability simulation in order to account for652
the magnitude of the effects described above. This simulation was performed653
on the basis of the fourth model of Table 7, which corresponds to the654
fully specified model for the 2004-2011 period. After running the model, we655
obtained 10,000 random draws of the coefficients obtained. The Y axis of the656
graph in Figure 6 corresponds to the change in probabilities and its 95 per657
cent confidence intervals when going from a minimal to a maximal value of658
party discourse. The rest of the covariates have been fixed at their mean. The659
82Hibbs and Vasilatos (1982); C. J. Anderson (1995)
83Hellwig (2012)
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X axis corresponds to each of the five categories of our dependent variable660
(“very good”, “good”, “neutral”, “bad”, and “very bad”)661
Figure 6: Change in Probability of Subjective Economic Evaluations caused
by changes in Level of Party Discourse
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Effect party discourse
As shown in Figure 6, the conditioning effect of the PP’s discourse when in662
opposition affected mostly the respondents with very positive views. For this663
group the change in probabilities when there is a change in discourse is quite664
significant, with a drop of around 15% when discourse is at it’s highest. This665
15% drop sees a mirror increase in the Neutral and Bad categories where a666
change in party discourse increases the probabilities of having Neutral or Bad667
views of the economy by 6% (in each). Party discourse thus tends to increase668
the probability of having moderately bad views on economic performance669
and to decrease very positive views of it. The magnitudes of change caused670
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by party discourse are rather remarkable and very significant.84671
The effects of the macroeconomic variables and of vote choice are as expected.672
Macroeconomic indicators remain the most influential variables, and vote673
choice has important effect -even if smaller than the effect for discourse-. The674
effects of the control variables are very consistent across model specifications.675
Being a man, having lower levels of education, being young, and being676
unemployed are also consistently associated with more negative economic677
evaluations.678
Given the time series nature of our level-2 equation, we replicated the679
fully specified model adding a lagged monthly average of the dependent680
variable as a predictor. This allows us to rule out the possibility of temporal681
autocorrelation bias. After this test the effect of the PP’s discourse remained682
at conventional levels of significance, while the effect of unemployment683
vanished. We also replicated our main models (fully specified models684
in Tables 6 and 7 above) including a time trend in the fixed part of685
the equation, and our substantive results remained unchanged. Only the686
PP’s discourse remains strongly significant when in opposition, while the687
coefficients of unemployment fails to reach statistical significance in the688
84Overall, the results indicate that the objective macro-economy is the strongest driver
of subjective economic perceptions. The effect of unemployment is associated with a 35
per cent of probability increase to have a neutral opinion, and with about a 30 per cent
of probability increase to have a bad opinion. The effect of inflation is the strongest
when predicting neutral opinions (45 per cent of probability increase), and weaker than
unemployment when predicting negative views (20 per cent increase). Being a PP (PSOE)
voter is associated with a 5 per cent increase (decrease) to have neutral and negative
economic views.
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1996-2004 period).85689
4.1 Heterogeneous effects690
It could be argued that the direct average effect of the PP’s discourse when691
in opposition was partly driven by the dramatic turn of the real economy in692
the second part of the 2004-2011 period. As stated above, in order to claim693
substantively meaningful conditioning effects of party discourse, the effect694
of this discourse has to be independent from the real economy. This does695
not only imply that the direct effect of party discourse needs to preserve its696
level of significance when controlling for real economic indicators (as shown697
above), but that the effect of partisan discourse cannot depend on any value698
of unemployment and inflation. In order to test this independence of party699
discourse, we ran tests modelling the PP and PSOE’s party discourse as a700
function of economic indicators over the whole time span considered here,701
none of the models turned up as significant 86. This implies that the effect of702
the issue owner was equally visible at high and low levels of unemployment703
and inflation.704
In order to further check for heterogeneous effects, we also re-run the705
fully specified models shown in Tables 6 and 7 for each electoral cycle.87706
Consistently with our previous models, party discourse fails to reach707
85Results available in Tables A.6 and A.7 of the online appendix.
86Results available in Table A.7 of the online appendix.
87Results available in Table A.8 of the online appendix.
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statistical significance in the 1996-2000 and 2000-2004 periods. Interestingly,708
however, the effect of PP discourse during the PSOE’s incumbency is more709
clearly observable in the 2004-2008 period (log odds = 0.97; standard error =710
0.57; p = 0.08). When simulating probabilities, the effect of party discourse on711
”good” and ”very bad” evaluations is non-significant, but the relative effect712
size of party discourse decreasing ”very positive” and increasing ”neutral”713
and ”bad” views is almost identical to the simulations reported in Figure714
6. When looking at the 2008-2011 period on its own, the effect of PP715
discourse on negative economic evaluations is only visible around the middle716
of the electoral cycle. More specifically, there is a positive contemporaneous717
bivariate correlation between economic perceptions and PP discourse (r =718
0.31) between October 2009 and November 2010. This corresponds to 14719
months right in the middle of the electoral cycle. By contrast, the fluctuation720
of PP discourse at the very beginning and very end of the 2008-2011721
cycle does not correspond with the steady increase of negative economic722
evaluations in public opinion. This finding implies that party discourse has723
an effect as long as economic turbulences are not so strong as to overshadow724
other effects. Despite the idiosyncratic last electoral cycle analyzed, however,725
the average effect of PP discourse on negative economic evaluations emerges726
as strong and significant when analysing the 2004-2011 period altogether.727
This means that the coefficient of PP discourse across all model specifications728
in Table 7 is able to pick up the consistent hypothesised relationship between729
PP discourse and economic perceptions throughout the whole 2004-2008730
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period and throughout the middle of the 2008-2011 period.731
Similarly to the previous check, it can be argued that the substantive effect of732
party discourse could be minimized if it only has an observable effect on very733
close voters or partisans. If that was the case, party discourse would have an734
interesting mobilizing effect of its own party constituency rather than a more735
transversal persuasion effect across more distant ideological spaces. To check736
for this possibility a set of interactions between party discourse and vote737
choice across the whole time span analyzed were modelled. In this case, some738
interactions between party discourse and partisan predispositions turn up as739
significant. When simulating the actual magnitude of the effects, however, the740
effect size of these interactions are minimal and sometimes barely significant.741
Moreover, the effect size of party discourse is usually equivalent for partisans742
and non-partisans88.743
88The magnitudes and significance of the interactions with vote choice are shown in
Figure A.1 and Table A.9 of the online appendix.
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5 Conclusion744
The study of the antecedents of citizens’ assessments of the economy’s745
performance has important implications for public opinion literature,746
economic voting studies, and democratic accountability in general. The747
effect of objective macro-economic indicators and individual ideological748
predispositions has centered the attention of the debate over the last decade.749
Even if the role of parties in activating issues of political competition has750
proved to be important in close research areas, a top-down perspective on751
the effect of party discourse on public economic perceptions was lacking until752
now. We believe that a complete portrait of the political conditioning of753
economic evaluations cannot be done without analyzing what parties say754
about the economy. In this article we made a step forward in understanding755
an additional mechanism through which subjective evaluations of the756
economy may not always match economic reality.757
We modelled novel monthly data on party salience on the economy through758
their interventions in the Parliament, macro-economic changes, and survey759
data predicting economic evaluations over four electoral cycles in Spain760
(1996-2011). Our results, via content analysis techniques and ordinal logit761
hierarchical regressions, confirm the association of macro-economic changes762
(which are the strongest aggregate determinant of economic evaluations)763
and political predispositions like left-right ideology and vote choice with764
economic evaluations. In all, we find evidence of both classic and revisionist765
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interpretations of economic perceptions in a relatively understudied context766
like Spain. When adding the salience of economic issues in the discourse767
of the two main parties in competition, we find that party discourse can768
matter beyond and independently from macro-economic conditions and769
individual-level heuristics. Two conditions need to be met in our data for770
party messages to have an effect, however. First, the party conditioning771
public economic perceptions has to be the issue owner, which in this case772
is the main right-wing party (PP) for almost the whole time span analyzed.773
Second, the issue owner has to be in opposition. These results confirm the774
idea that while the incumbent has to deal with facts, in the absence of an775
up to date record of performance, the challenger can be judged by talk and776
therefore has more leverage and credibility to persuade voters 89. Moreover,777
our results are consistent with negativity biases documented in psychological778
and political science literatures, whereby negative inputs are more likely to779
be set in the public agenda and to make an impression in public opinion780
90.781
Overall, our results suggest that the impact of party discourse is remarkable782
even if highly conditional. The high conditionality of our findings is consistent783
with current research on framing effects and public opinion showing that784
external cues are not equally likely to manipulate the public’s views in785
contemporary democracies 91. Once the relevant conditions are met, however,786
89Popkin (1995)
90Lau (1985); Vonk (1996); Singh and Teoh (2000); Soroka (2006)
91Zaller (1992); Chong and Druckman (2007, 2010)
48
our results suggest important persuasion effects from parties, which are able787
to shape public opinion independently from how the economy is really doing788
and in ideological spaces that are not necessarily proximal. This implies that789
parties need to be brought into the equations used in economic voting studies.790
Previous research has shown how parties have the capacity to increase the791
link between the economy and electoral results by adopting distinct economic792
positions 92 and by sending appropriate competence signals 93. Our research793
builds upon this and shows that parties are also able to shape economic794
evaluations.795
Our findings cannot be interpreted as a sign that objective facts and classical796
democratic accountability play no role. Not only macro-economic levels are797
the strongest determinant of citizens’ subjective economic views, but to798
be effective parties need to have both economic credibility and freedom to799
articulate a discourse free from the cost of governing. This interpretation800
allows us to also build upon recent research analyzing parties economic801
communication strategies. We confirm Vavreck’s proposition that, in bad802
economic times, incumbent parties optimal strategy is to bring advantageous803
non-economic issues into the agenda 94. This is so because even if the804
opposition party does not have a high economic reputation, economic reality805
will exert a negative effect on its own. Our analyses also suggest, however,806
that talking about the economy in good economic times will not have any807
92Hellwig (2012)
93R. M. Duch and Stevenson (2008)
94Vavreck (2009)
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direct persuasion effect in favour of the incumbent. Opposition parties are808
more likely to set the economy into the agenda and to actually condition809
public views in a way that is not necessarily consistent with economic810
reality.811
Future research will have to test the validity of our propositions in new812
countries and economic contexts. Spain is a conservative test for party813
persuasion effects, given the blatant and salient decrease in objective814
economic performance over the last years. It is also a relatively highly815
comparable case across Western democracies, given the proportional and816
multiparty character of its electoral system. It is also true, however, that817
the prominent role of the two main Spanish mainstream parties allows us818
to identify the dynamics between government and opposition more easily819
than in systems with coalition governments and less clarity of responsibility.820
More systematic measures of issue ownership and economic credibility will821
also have to be discussed and analyzed, in order to generalize when and822
why economic credibility is a necessary condition for parties to effectively823
persuade public opinion.824
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